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ABSTRACT
This study estimates the forward-looking monetary policy reaction function for Sri
Lanka using monthly data from 1980 to 2017. The results indicate that the Central
Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) followed the Taylor rule to set interest rates. Our forwardlooking model estimations show that the coefficient on inflation increases over time,
reflecting the greater focus on price stability by the bank. The results suggest that the
CBSL reacted to nominal exchange rate depreciation by tightening monetary policy.
Although the degree of interest rate smoothness gradually decreases over time, the
study shows that the CBSL did not react to movements in fiscal deficit during the
period under investigation. This finding suggests that the inclusion of fiscal deficit in
the Taylor rule does not provide a better specification of the policy reaction function
in Sri Lanka.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Taylor (1993) rule, which defines monetary policy based on the deviations
of output and inflation from their respective targets, is a popular benchmark for
assessing the monetary policy stance of central banks (Orphanides, 2001; Taylor
and Williams, 2010). Several economists argue that central banks should follow a
simple policy instrument rule whose execution will have a significant impact on
economic performance (Bernanke, 2010; Taylor, 2013). A flexible exchange rate in
conjunction with a simple monetary policy rule based on inflation targeting is the
only sound monetary policy available for developing and emerging economies
(Taylor, 2000). However, numerous studies have criticized the Taylor rule on
the grounds of its lack of practical applicability (McCallum and Nelson, 1999;
Svensson, 2003; Martin and Milas, 2013; Ghosh et al., 2016). In the aftermath of
the financial crisis of 2007–2008, several major economies faced prolonged periods
of low nominal interest rates and even faced a zero lower bound. This led major
central banks to adopt nonstandard measures (Jung, 2018), and the policy rates of
several central banks were subject to great deviations. The policy rates of major
central banks have thus been typically below the levels implied by the Taylor rule,
and the deviations of policy interest rates from the levels implied by the Taylor
rule have increased, especially since the early 2000s. Taylor (2013) argues that
deviations from the Taylor rule could be due to international spillovers. The rule
could thus still be sound, since a central bank can still pursue other measures to
ease its monetary policy stance, even when the economy experiences a zero lower
bound.
However, in the recent years, several studies have reinvestigated the practical
applicability of the original Taylor rule while incorporating theoretically important
variables that central banks should consider to enhance the stabilization role of
monetary policy (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Taylor and Williams, 2010; Sargent,
2014).1 In addition to output and inflation, these studies have highlighted that the
policy response of central banks should focus on variables such as asset prices,
fiscal deficit, exchange rates, commodity prices, and other business cycle variables
(Chuku and Middleditch, 2016). Studies, such as those of Gray (2012) and Taylor
(2013), have shown that the specification of the Taylor rule can be enhanced
through the addition of the spillover of central bank decisions in other countries.
At the current stage, however, it appears that central banks are using the simple
monetary policy rule as a reference guide rather following a specific fixed rule
(Jung, 2018).
Over the past three decades, although the Sri Lankan economy has registered
high levels of growth and low levels of inflation, both inflation and growth have
been highly volatile, with a notable and regular cyclical behavior. The variability
of inflation has dropped noticeably, whereas that of output has increased
significantly. The economy has experienced a transition from regimes of relatively
low volatility to more volatile regimes. In this context, the present study examines
whether the monetary policy reaction function in Sri Lanka is associated with
appropriate policy settings, as suggested by the Taylor rule, based on implications
of the Taylor principle. We investigate the Taylor principle empirically within
1

Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), Woodford (2001), Svensson (2003), Martin and Milas (2013), and Caglayan
et al. (2016) also investigate the original Taylor rule.
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the framework of the augmented Taylor rule. Since a lack of fiscal discipline is
incompatible with the goal of price stability, fiscal variables are considered to play
an important role in the monetary policy strategy of many developing economies
(Allard, Catenaro, Vidal, and Wolswijk, 2013). Sri Lanka is no exception in this
regard. Since Sri Lanka encounters fiscal constraints over the period of study, we
include fiscal deficit in the augmented Taylor rule. This allows us to capture the
role of fiscal policy in explaining the dynamic behavior of the nominal interest
rate in Sri Lanka (Bodea and Higashijima, 2017). In this context, the present study
offers new empirical evidence on the role of fiscal deficit in the policy reaction
function of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL). The study’s entire sample period
is divided into three subperiods, based on structural changes that have taken place
in the Sri Lankan economy.
The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. First, from the
estimated forward-looking open economy Taylor rule, we find that the Taylor
principle does not hold for the full-sample period. However, the subsample
analysis carried out across different policy regimes confirms satisfaction of the
Taylor principle in all periods, except from 1980 to 2000. Second, we find that Sri
Lankan policymakers reacted to nominal exchange rate depreciation by tightening
monetary policy. The study also finds that the degree of interest rate smoothness
has gradually decreased over time. Meanwhile, the size of the coefficient on
inflation is found to increase over time, reflecting greater focus on price stability.
Finally, this study provides evidence that the monetary authority in Sri Lanka
did not react to movements in fiscal deficit during the period under investigation.
This finding suggests that the inclusion of fiscal deficit in the Taylor rule does
not provide a better specification of the policy reaction function in Sri Lanka. The
present study provides empirical support for those studies that estimate forwardlooking policy reaction functions. Additionally, this study offers new empirical
evidence with respect to the role of fiscal deficit in the policy reaction function of
the CBSL.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the
literature on the Taylor rule. Section III outlines the data and methodological
framework. Section IV provides quantitative insights on the monetary policy
reaction function in Sri Lanka. Finally, Section V summarizes the study’s major
findings.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The standard Taylor rule, which follows the seminal contribution of Taylor (1993),
is increasingly used in empirical research on monetary policy and is written as
follows:
(1)
where it is the policy interest rate, r̅ is the equilibrium real interest rate, πt is the
inflation rate, π* is the targeted inflation rate, and (yt-yt*) denotes the output gap. In
Taylor’s (1993) study of the Federal Reserve System’s monetary policy from 1987
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to 1992, a value of 0.5 is assigned to both βπ and βy. Further, Taylor assigns a value
of two to r̅. Since the Federal Reserve was targeting an inflation rate of 2% when
both inflation and output were at their respective target levels, the “equilibrium”
federal funds rate is equal to four.
The Taylor principle consist of four elements. The first states that the coefficient
on inflation should be significant and greater than one. Accordingly, monetary
policy should respond to increases in inflation with more than a one-to-one increase
in the nominal interest rate in order for the real interest rate to increase (Woodford,
2001, 2007; Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al., 2015). Hence, theoretical studies on the
stabilizing properties of Taylor-type rules reveal the importance of implementing
a so-called active monetary policy.2 The second element of the principle states that
the coefficient of the output gap should be significant and greater than zero but
less than one. Satisfying these two components of the principle helps to stabilize
business cycle fluctuations (Ince, Molodtsova, and Papell, 2016). Accordingly, the
central bank will reduce its policy rates when inflation, the output gap, or both
decline. The third element of the principle states that the target inflation rate3
should equal 2.0%. The last component of the principle states that the equilibrium
real interest rate should be constant and equal to 2.0%. Although it is possible
to estimate both inflation targets and equilibrium real interest rates, the criteria
for satisfying the last two principle elements do not have an exact statistical
interpretation. Therefore, most studies on the Taylor rule typically focus on the
first element of the principal. This study will follow a similar approach.
Several studies have estimated the policy reaction functions of the central
banks in both developing and advanced economies. However, recent studies have
shown that the reaction functions of the central banks are often confronted with
issues of nonlinearity, structural breaks, and time-varying behavior (Chuku and
Middleditch, 2016). A recent study by Jung (2018), who investigates the monetary
policy stance of the European Central Bank during the 2008 global financial crisis,
shows that both the Taylor rule and the McCallum rule (2000) are closely related
in terms of explaining the European Central Bank’s monetary policy stance.
The author finds that the interest rates derived using both rules are close to the
actual policy rates for most of the period considered. However, the study finds
no evidence to support the superiority of McCallum’s (2000) rule compared to
Taylor’s rule, especially when interest rates are very low.
Miles and Schreyer (2012) examine the reaction functions of the central banks
of four Asian countries, namely, Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, and Indonesia, using
quantile regression analysis. Their results present evidence of nonlinearities in the
reaction functions, but with cross-country differences. For instance, the monetary
authorities in Indonesia do not respond to the output gap in the lower quantiles,
whereas the central bank of Korea responds to the output gap in both quantiles.
However, among the four countries, only the central banks of Malaysia and
Indonesia react to exchange rate fluctuations. A recent study by Jawadi, Mallick,
and Sousa (2014), using a smooth transition regression model, shows that central
2

3

An active monetary policy rule is one in which the monetary authority satisfies the Taylor principle,
in that they adjust the nominal interest rate such that the real interest rate rises in response to excess
inflation. Conversely, a passive monetary rule is one that fails to satisfy this principle.
The inflation target is adopted either implicitly or explicitly by many central banks in both developed
and developing economies.
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banks in China and Brazil significantly react to changes in the real effective
exchange rate. Shrestha and Semmler (2015) estimate a simple Taylor rule for five
East Asian countries, namely, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and
Indonesia. They argue that the baseline Taylor rule is not sufficient to describe
monetary policy in emerging countries and suggest that the policy rule of the
central bank should also include financial conditions. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1998) investigate the empirical validity of the Taylor rule in two sets of countries,
the G3 (Germany, Japan, and the United States) and the E3 (the United Kingdom,
France, and Italy). Their results show that the monetary authorities in G3 countries
adjusted the real interest rate in response to inflationary pressures, following a
forward-looking rather than a backward-looking monetary policy rule. However,
the study reveals that France and Italy follow very closely the interest rate set by
the Deutsche Bundesbank.
A recent study by Chuku and Middleditch (2016) shows that the monetary
and fiscal authorities in economies with high levels of resource exports respond
to commodity price slack, but in different ways, depending on the policy
regime in place. This literature argues that monetary authorities in primary
commodity export economies often do not react aggressively enough to achieve
their announced inflation targets. Similarly, using a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model of a small open economy, Kumhof, Nunes, and Yakadina (2010),
for example, examine whether a central bank can follow an inflation target under
fiscal dominance. Their results suggest that it is impractical and undesirable for
central banks to satisfy the Taylor principle when an economy experiences fiscal
dominance. In particular, Kumhof et al. show that, under fiscal dominance, an
interest rate rule that includes public debt would result in high inflation volatility.
The authors further show that welfare gains generated through the reaction of
fiscal variables are negligible compared to the gains derived from the elimination
of fiscal dominance. Therefore, the literature argues that fiscal reform is crucial
before an inflation-targeting framework can be implemented by central banks in
either developing or advanced economies.
Clarita, Gali, and Gertler (2000) estimate the forward-looking monetary policy
reaction functions of the United States from 1960 to 1996. Based on the estimated
reaction functions across periods, they find substantial differences in the way
monetary policy was conducted during the period investigated: from 1960 to
1979,4 the Fed typically raised its policy rates by less than any increase in expected
inflation, thus allowing real short-term interest rates to decline as expected
inflation increased. Conversely, from 1979 to 1996, the Fed raised the real as well
as nominal short-term interest rates in response to higher expected inflation. These
results show that the interest rate policy after 1979 was much more sensitive to
changes in expected inflation compared to before.
In the case of Sri Lanka, Perera and Jayawickrema (2013) estimate alternative
monetary policy reaction functions using the standard linear Taylor rule. Using
quarterly data for the period from 1996 to 2013, they find that the size of the
coefficient on the inflation gap increases over time, reflecting greater focus on
4

The period from 1960 to 1979 corresponds to the tenures of William M. Martin, Arthur Burns, and
G. William Miller as Federal Reserve chair, while the second period, from 1979 to 1996, encompasses
the tenures of Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan as Fed chair.
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price stability. However, their results suggest that the responses to fluctuations
in output gap were greater than the deviations in inflation. Meanwhile, using an
open economy New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model,
Ehelepola (2015) estimates the welfare-maximizing optimal monetary policy rules
for Sri Lanka. The author finds that policymakers responded more aggressively
to inflation but had only a moderate response to the output gap. Ehelepola shows
that policymakers also reacted to exchange rate fluctuations.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data
This study uses monthly time series data for the period from January 1980 to
December 2017; see Appendix Figure 1A for a plot of the data. The study begins in
1980 to coincide with the adoption of the monetary targeting a policy framework
in Sri Lanka. The data on the exchange rates, interest rates, and fiscal variables are
mainly drawn from annual reports of the CBSL. The data for other variables were
extracted from three different sources. The growth rates of the real gross domestic
production (GDP) and inflation rates are mainly based on various publications
of the Department of Census and Statistics of Sri Lanka. Since the monthly real
GDP series are not available for Sri Lanka, we use the cubic spline interpolation
technique proposed by Fox (2000) to convert the available data to a monthly series.
Due to the unavailability of monthly time series data on the policy rates of the
CBSL, we consider the three-month Treasury bill rate to be the short-term interest
rate. The output gap is calculated as the percentage deviation of the real GDP from
its trend value obtained by the Hodrick–Prescott filter. Although the Hodrick–
Prescott filter has shortcomings, we use it because of its flexibility in tracking trend
output (Konuki, 2010). A detailed description of the data series and their sources is
given in the Appendix Table A1. The Appendix Tables A2 and A3 also include the
descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables.
Figure 1.
Movements of the Inflation and Output Growth in Levels
This figure plots two series—the inflation rate and the economic growth rate. The time-series data are from 1980 to
2017.
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Figure 1.
Movements of the Inflation and Output Growth in Levels (Continued)
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B. Methodology
B1. Estimation of Forward-looking Policy Reaction Functions
Though the literature on interest rate rules typically accounts only for inflation and
the output gap, we augment the Taylor rule with both fiscal and nonfiscal variables.
Several empirical studies show that the exchange rate pass-through levels are high
in many emerging economies and play an important role in maintaining external
competitiveness; see Mohanty and Klau (2004) and references therein. In addition,
open economy policy reaction functions play a significant role in the conduct of
monetary policy in both emerging and developing economies. Hence, we include
the exchange rate in our policy reaction function to represent the open economy.
Moreover, we consider a lagged interest rate to assume that the monetary
authority in Sri Lanka tries to smooth the interest rate and changes its policy rates
gradually in response to economic fluctuations (Woodford, 2002). The interest rate
smoothing implies that the interest rates will be autocorrelated over time.
Since lack of fiscal discipline is incompatible with the goal of price stability,
fiscal variables are considered to play an important role in the monetary policy
strategy of many developing economies (Allard, Catenaro, Vidal, and Wolswijk,
2013). Sri Lanka is no exception in this regard. It is subject to fiscal constraint over
periods, and we therefore include fiscal deficit in the augmented Taylor rule. This
allows us to capture the role of fiscal policy in explaining the dynamic behavior of
the nominal interest rate in Sri Lanka (Bodea and Higashijima, 2017).
The augmented Taylor rule to be estimated is specified as follows:
(2)
(3)
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2020
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where t is the year index, E is the expectations operator, πdev is the inflation’s
deviation from the targeted level, ygap is the output gap, Δex is the first difference
of the exchange rate, and fd is the fiscal deficit. Following Equation (3), the
short-term nominal interest rate responds to inflation deviations, the output
gap, nominal exchange rate depreciation, and the fiscal deficit. The parameter
ρ measures the degree of interest rate smoothing. The coefficients βπ, βy, βex and
βfd represent the central bank’s response to changes in inflation, the output gap,
nominal exchange rate depreciation, and the fiscal deficit respectively. A positive
sign for the coefficient of fiscal deficit suggests that the nominal interest rate
should be increased when the fiscal deficit increases. In other words, the monetary
policy should be tightened when the economy experiences rapid growth of the
fiscal deficit, and monetary policy easement should be pursued when the fiscal
deficit growth rate decreases. The term εt is an uncorrelated monetary policy
shock that follows a first-order autoregressive specification and is assumed to be
a white noise process.
Empirical studies find that a forward-looking policy reaction function is more
realistic than a backward-looking one (Clarida et al., 1998, 2000). Hence, many
central banks use the expected future inflation and output gap to determine their
policy rates. Thus, we estimate the augmented policy reaction functions given
in Equations (2) and (3) under forward-looking specifications. We begin with
estimating the forward-looking policy reaction functions excluding the fiscal
deficit. Thereafter, we will include the fiscal deficit along with other variables,
such as the exchange rate, the output gap, and inflation. The forward-looking
policy reaction functions are estimated for both the full-sample and subsample
periods. The generalized method of moments (GMM) has become the most
relevant method to estimate forward-looking rational expectations models, and
the empirical literature often uses the GMM to estimate forward-looking policy
reaction functions (Clarida et al., 2000). The present study also uses the GMM
approach to estimate the augmented forward-looking policy reaction functions.
Throughout the analysis, we assume that the CBSL follows an independent
monetary policy.
C. Analytical Framework
Since our sample involves the period around Sri Lanka’s introduction of the
flexible exchange rate in January 2001 and the end of the Sri Lankan Civil War in
2009, we focus in particular on the presence of the structural break in the monetary
policy in Sri Lanka.5 The start of the period in 1980 corresponds to the introduction
of a monetary targeting framework in Sri Lanka. The entire sample period will be
divided into three subperiods. Since the country adopted a flexible exchange rate
in January 2001, we consider the first sample period to be from January 1980 to
December 2000. The civil war that started in 1983 ended in May 2009; therefore, the
second and third periods run from January 2001 to May 2009 and from June 2009
5

In this study, we do not undertake a formal structural break test since it is the scope of the paper;
however, future studies follow Sharma et al. (2019) and Sharma (2019) can study break dates using
the Narayan and Popp (2010, 2013) test.
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to December 2017, respectively. The analysis is conducted for both the full-sample
and subperiods. The stationary properties of all the series considered in this study
are tested using the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and Phillips–Perron tests.
The unit root test will be carried out at both the levels and first differences of
each series, while the Akaike information criterion with a default lag order will be
used to select the order of augmentation in the ADF regression. Since the Schwarz
information criterion is widely known as a parsimonious model and selects the
smallest possible lag length, we use it to select the optimal lag length in this study
(Babu and Rao, 2004).
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Sri Lanka’s Forward-looking Monetary Policy Reaction Function
In this section, we first examine the stationary properties of the variables and
then estimate the forward-looking Taylor curve with and without the fiscal deficit
for the period from 1980 to 2017. The results of unit root tests are presented in
Table 1. The results confirm that four variables are nonstationary, since the null
hypothesis of the ADF and Phillips–Perron tests cannot be rejected at the 5% level
of significance. However, the remaining variables are found to be integrated with
order one.

Table 1.
Unit Root Tests
This table reports results from unit root tests. Panel A has ADF test results while Panel B contains PP test results. Both
tests are conducted on the levels and first difference of the variables and for a model that includes (i) intercept only
and (ii) intercept and trend. The list of variables appears in column 1. Finally, * (**) *** indicate statistical significance
at the 1% (5%) 10% levels.

Panel A: ADF Test
Panel B: PP Test
Levels
First Differences
Levels
First Differences
Order of
Variable
Trend
Trend
Trend
Trend Integration
Intercept
and
Intercept
and
Intercept
and
Intercept
and
Intercept
Intercept
Intercept
Intercept
CPI

4.9022

-0.6368

-11.0026* -16.8477*

4.2141

-0.6790

-17.5240* -17.6984*

I (1)

RGDP

-4.6868*

-4.7417*

-9.8796*

-4.3089*

-4.3365* -13.9667* -13.9462*

I (0)

TBILL

-2.9338** -3.7319** -13.6918* -13.6981* -3.0159**

-3.7901* -23.2074* -23.2056*

I (0)

-2.2981

-14.8817* -14.9416*

I (1)

-4.0928

-17.2131 -17.2032

I (0)

EXR
FB

-9.8748*

0.6854

-2.7292

-8.9320*

-9.0061

1.0176

-2.7957

-3.4580

-7.3576

-7.3784

-3.6453

***

**

*

*

*

*

*

*

As shown in Figure 1, neither inflation nor economic growth exhibits any trend
over the periods. The Sri Lankan economy registered an inflation rate greater than
30% during the early 1980s. However, this figure declined till 1985, but thereafter
escalated until the early part of the 1990s. This trend shows that Sri Lanka
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2020
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experienced very high levels of inflation during the 1980s and 1990s, suggesting
that inflation variability must have had a much lower weight in the policymaker’s
loss function. However, after late 2009, the inflation rate was at single-digit levels.
Meanwhile, during the study period, the economy witnessed an average growth
rate of 5%. Especially high levels of economic growth can be observed following
the end of the civil war, in 2009. However, the fluctuations in the inflation rate are
greater than those of the economic growth rate.
During the sample period, the variability of inflation decreases while the
variability of output increases, implying an unambiguous improvement in
macroeconomic performance. This result further indicates that the central bank
predominantly considered implicit inflation targeting more important. The graph
in Figure 1 also highlights that low inflation variability was attained at the expense
of increased output variability.
Figure 2.
Movements of the Variability of Inflation and Output Growth
This figure plots two series—the difference of the inflation rate and the difference of the economic growth rate. The
time-series data are from 1980 to 2017.
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According to Figure 2, the volatility of inflation is much higher compared to
that of output growth. Although a high level of inflation volatility is observed
prior to 2010, volatility diminishes afterward. This finding implies that the Sri
Lankan economy experienced a transition from relatively higher volatile inflation
regimes at the beginning of the study period to more stable regimes thereafter.
The reduced volatilities in inflation could be largely supported by the low level
of external and domestic supply shocks, a more stable economic structure, and
the implementation of better monetary policy (Jegajeewan, 2016). The volatility
of output growth was almost stable until the end of 1995; however, it increased
gradually after 1996. Notably, much greater volatility is observed after 2010.
After examining the properties of the variables, we estimate the forwardlooking open economy policy reaction functions for Sri Lanka. We consider the
three-month Treasury bill rate as the monetary policy instrument. Further, we
assume that the central bank responds to changes in inflation, the output gap,
and the exchange rate while focusing on smoothness in the interest rate. Since the
conduct of monetary policy changes over the periods, the behavior of the central
bank also changes. Therefore, to account for structural breaks, we estimate the
policy reaction function for each subsample period separately. The results are
presented in Table 2. They show that the p-values for the estimated J-statistic6 are
significantly above 5%. This finding suggests that the null hypothesis of the model
being correctly specified cannot be rejected, even at the 10% level of significance.
The results show that the estimated policy reaction functions had adequate
restrictions and that all the models are correctly specified. This further confirms
that the estimated functions satisfy all the moment restrictions.
Table 2.
Forward-Looking Policy Reaction Functions
This table reports results from the forward-looking policy reaction functions. Column 2 notes results for the fullsample period (1980-2017) while the rest of the three columns have results for each of the three regimes, namely
the period 1980-2000 (regime 1), 2001-2009 (regime 2), and 2009-2017 (regime 3). Finally, * (**) *** indicate statistical
significance at the 1% (5%) 10% levels.

Variable
β0
βπ
βy
βex
ρ

6

Period
1980-2017
(Full Sample)

Regime 1
(1980-2000)

Regime 2
(2001-2009)

Regime 3
(2009-2017)

5.4865
(1.6815)
0.6074***
(0.1514)
1.1839***
(0.3127)
0.0675***
(0.0096)
0.9652***
(0.0064)

10.5218
(2.0454)
0.1939
(0.1766)
0.7598
(0.5591)
0.3595***
(0.1136)
0.9167***
(0.0288)

-10.5812
(2.4398)
1.9139***
(0.2040)
1.2236***
(0.5132)
0.2281***
(0.0139)
0.9748***
(0.0024)

-3.9490
(16.8019)
1.8604***
(0.2228)
1.4850**
(1.7780)
0.0794***
(0.0173)
0.9897***
(0.0154)

The J-statistic is used to test for overidentifying restrictions in the models estimated using the GMM
approach.
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Table 2.
Forward-Looking Policy Reaction Functions (Continued)
Variable
No. of. Obs.
Adj. R-squared
S.E. of Regression
Durbin-Watson Stat.
J-Statistic
Prob. (J-Statistic)
Instrument Rank

Period
1980-2017
(Full Sample)

Regime 1
(1980-2000)

Regime 2
(2001-2009)

Regime 3
(2009-2017)

432
0.9291
0.9450
2.0339
17.2703
(0.4362)
22

228
0.7878
0.9451
2.1304
9.3424
(0.3266)
22

76
0.9692
0.6556
2.1038
14.5156
(0.1272)
22

79
0.9276
0.4124
1.9821
10.3648
(0.8876)
22

This study finds that the coefficients of the estimated policy reaction functions
change with different magnitudes. The estimates of βπ have the expected sign
and are significant in all periods, except from 1980 to 2000. However, the results
show that the coefficients differ considerably across policy regimes. During the
period from 1980 to 2000, the estimated coefficient is nonsignificant and less than
one (0.1939), indicating that the first Taylor principle does not hold in this period.
This finding further confirms that the monetary policy was passive during this
period. Violation of the Taylor principle could be an important factor that partly
contributes to the high levels of inflation that Sri Lanka experienced from 1980 to
2000. However, the estimated coefficients have a significant positive sign in the
remainder of the policy reaction functions. The coefficients are significantly above
one for the periods from 2001 to 2009 (1.9139) and from 2009 to 2017 (1.8604),
which indicates that the CBSL satisfied the first Taylor principle. Thus, an increase
in expected future inflation increases the probability of the policy rate being raised
during these periods. These estimations are consistent with recent results in the
literature. For example, Ehelepola (2015) estimates an inflation coefficient of 1.18
and shows that the CBSL responded to inflation more aggressively compared to
the past.
The estimated coefficients of βy, which measures the reactions of the interest
rate to the output gap, had, as expected, a significant and positive impact on the
policy rates in all the estimated reaction functions, except for the first regime. This
result implies that the second Taylor principle fails to hold only during the period
from 1980 to 2000. Although the estimated policy reaction function for the full
sample shows that the CBSL paid greater attention to stabilization of the output,
compared to inflation, the reaction functions estimated for the different policy
regimes show that the policymakers reacted aggressively to stabilize both output
and inflation. This is particularly notable during the second and third regimes. The
results further show that the size of the inflation coefficient increases over time,
compared to the output gap, reflecting the CBSL’s greater focus on price stability.
These results are consistent with those of Perera and Jayawickrama (2013) for Sri
Lanka.
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Although, the exchange rate is not a standard variable in policy reaction
functions, we find that the estimated coefficients for βex are positive and significant
in all four reaction functions. This result indicates that the CBSL reacted to nominal
exchange rate depreciation by tightening monetary policy. The magnitude of the
coefficient is found to be large during the period from 1980 to 2000, compared
to other periods. If the Sri Lankan rupee depreciates against the US dollar, one
would expect the central bank to increase its policy rates to offset the depreciation
of the domestic currency. These results are consistent with previous research by
Ehelepola (2015), who shows that the magnitude of the exchange rate coefficient
is positive and significant but very low for Sri Lanka. However, these results
contradict some of the previous literature. For example, Patra and Kapoor (2012)
find that the exchange rate is nonsignificant in their policy reaction functions they
estimate for India, and they therefore conclude that policy rates were not used to
target a level or band of the exchange rate. Similarly, McCauley (2006) finds that the
central bank did not react to changes in the exchange rate and that the authorities
used other instruments to minimize the adverse impacts of the depreciation of
domestic currency. The empirical literature also argues that the strength of policy
reaction functions in response to exchange rate depreciation depends on whether
the central bank can use other instruments besides interest rates (Mohanty and
Klau, 2004).
The results further disclose that the estimated smoothing coefficients ( ) are
positive and significantly higher in all the reaction functions. These results confirm
significant interest rate inertia, despite changes in the conduct of monetary policy
across different policy regimes. Our results further confirm the conventional
wisdom that the central bank seeks smoothness by adjusting the interest rate.
This suggests that the CBSL changes its policy rates gradually in response to
macroeconomic developments.
B. Response to Fiscal Deficit by the CBSL
Since both the theoretical literature and empirical literature show a clear long-run
relation between the fiscal deficit and inflation, independent central banks pay
greater attention to fiscal discipline and pursue their fiscal policy preferences by
adjusting their policy rates (Sidaui, 2003; Piergallini, 2006; De Haan and Eijffinger,
2016). In the case of Sri Lanka, since the prices of several items, including energy
and transport services, are administered by the government, supply shocks
emerging from fiscal policy are particularly important in maintaining price
stability. This setting forces the monetary authority to pay great attention to the
developments on the fiscal front. In this section, we therefore estimate forwardlooking policy reaction functions incorporating the fiscal deficit to account for
the role of fiscal variables in determining interest rates. The estimated results are
presented in Table 3 and show that the p-values for the estimated J-statistics are
significantly above 5%. This finding suggests that the null hypothesis of the model
being correctly specified cannot be rejected, and we can therefore conclude that all
the policy reaction functions are correctly specified.
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Table 3.
Forward-Looking Policy Reaction Functions with Fiscal Deficit
This table reports results from the forward-looking policy reaction functions with fiscal deficit. Column 2 notes results
for the full-sample period (1980-2017) while the rest of the three columns have results for each of the three regimes,
namely for the period 1980-2000 (regime 1), 2001-2009 (regime 2), and 2009-2017 (regime 3). Finally, * (**) *** indicate
statistical significance at the 1% (5%) 10% levels.

Variable
β0
βπ
βy
βex
ρ
βfd
No. of. Obs.
Adj. R-squared
S.E. of Regression
Durbin-Watson Stat.
J-Statistic
Prob. (J-Statistic)
Instrument Rank

Period
1980-2017
(Full Sample)

Regime 1
(1980-2000)

Regime 2
(2001-2009)

Regime 3
(2009-2017)

3.4758
(1.8686)
0.7347***
(0.1707)
1.4067***
(0.3883)
0.0705***
(0.0084)
0.9660***
(0.0056)
0.0026
(0.0103)
432
0.9324
0.9229
2.1341
17.3406
(0.4315)
23

13.2376
(2.5445)
3.11634**
(1.4864)
-0.9509
(0.6439)
0.3798***
(0.0991)
0.8976***
(0.0298)
0.0032
(0.0271)
228
0.7827
0.5068
2.0782
7.1551
(0.9814)
23

-14.8080
(2.6079)
1.8905***
(0.1908)
-0.3466
(0.2324)
0.1529***
(0.0054)
0.9703***
(0.0030)
0.0963
(0.0758)
76
0.9677
0.6709
2.1047
16.0129
(0.1272)
23

8.2722
(2.1849)
0.3721***
(0.1055)
-0.1119
(0.1344)
0.0415**
(0.0206)
0.9207***
(0.0197)
0.0404
(0.0360)
79
0.9287
0.4252
1.9847
11.4336
(0.8832)
23

The estimated parameters of the output gap, inflation, the fiscal deficit, and
the exchange rate are also found to vary across different monetary policy regimes.
The results show that the CBSL responds significantly to inflation in both the fullsample and subsample analysis. According to the reaction functions, monetary
policy in Sri Lanka was active during the periods from 1980 to 2000 and from 2001
to 2009, but passive from 2009 to 2017.7 Moreover, the coefficients of the fiscal
deficit are positive but nonsignificant. Hence, there is substantial evidence to show
that the CBSL did not react to the movements of fiscal deficit during the period
under investigation. Since there is no literature on the role of the fiscal deficit in
the policy reaction function for the case of Sri Lanka, this study provides fresh
empirical evidence on the reaction of the interest rate to the fiscal deficit.
Although this study shows that the output gap coefficient for the fullsample analysis is significant, interestingly, the coefficient becomes negative and
statistically nonsignificant in the subsample analysis. This finding implies that the
CBSL does not satisfy the second Taylor principle, even though the coefficient of
7

The estimates of the inflation parameter that satisfy the Taylor principle are regarded as indicating
active monetary policy regimes, whereas the coefficients for inflation that are less than one are
classified as indicating passive monetary policy regimes.
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inflation is statistically significant and satisfies the benchmark value suggested
by Taylor (1993). This challenges results obtained while excluding fiscal deficit.
The negative and nonsignificant coefficients for the output gap could be due to
the inclusion of the fiscal deficit in the policy reaction functions (Sidaui, 2003).
Another reason could be measurement error in estimating the output gap.
Additionally, the results show that the reaction of the interest rate to the
exchange rate is positive and statistically significant. This finding is consistent
with our previous results and robust to different modifications of the Taylor rule.
The CBSL therefore reacted to nominal exchange rate depreciation by tightening
monetary policy. Moreover, the coefficients for the lagged interest rate appeared
positive and significant in all the estimated policy reaction functions, showing a
high degree of interest rate smoothing by the CBSL. This finding further indicates
that the CBSL changes its policy rates in small steps in response to macroeconomic
developments. However, the degree of smoothness decreases gradually over the
periods. Notably, the coefficient that increases from 0.89 in the period 1980–2000 to
0.97 in the period 2001–2009 gradually drops to 0.92 during the period 2009–2017.
These results allow us to conclude that interest rate smoothing, exchange rate
stability, and price stability play a greater role in determining the interest rate than
the output gap does. Additionally, after we incorporate the fiscal deficit, we find
the first Taylor principle to be satisfied in all the policy reaction functions, except
for the period from 2009 to 2017. However, since the coefficients of the fiscal deficit
are nonsignificant for all the policy reaction functions, one can conclude that the
policy reaction functions estimated excluding the fiscal deficit are more accurate
for Sri Lanka.
V. CONCLUSION
This study estimates the forward-looking monetary policy reaction function for Sri
Lanka using monthly data from 1980 to 2017. The estimated forward-looking policy
reaction functions for the full sample and subsamples provide mixed results. The
study finds that the coefficients of the estimated forward-looking policy reaction
functions differ across the periods in terms of sign, size, and statistical significance.
Based on a forward-looking open economy monetary reaction function for the full
sample, we find that the reaction of policymakers to fluctuations in the output gap
has been greater than their response to inflation. More specifically, the first Taylor
principle does not hold for the full-sample period. Meanwhile, the coefficient on
the output gap is above unity, confirming that policymakers paid more attention to
stabilization of the output. However, the subsample analysis shows contradicting
results.
The analysis confirms the satisfaction of the Taylor principle in all periods,
except from 1980 to 2000. The study further reveals that policymakers reacted to
nominal exchange rate depreciation by tightening monetary policy in both the
full-sample and the subsample analysis. Moreover, the study finds that the CBSL
changed its policy rates gradually in response to macroeconomic developments,
though the degree of smoothness was gradually reduced over time. The subsample
analysis further shows that the size of the coefficient on inflation increases over
time, reflecting greater focus on price stability. Meanwhile, the estimated forwardPublished by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2020
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looking reaction function that considers the fiscal deficit provides substantial
evidence to confirm that the monetary authority in Sri Lanka did not react to
movements in the fiscal deficit during the period under investigation. Although
the study finds that the output gap for the full sample is significant, it is interesting
to note that the coefficient of the output gap becomes negative and statistically
nonsignificant in all the subsample analyses after the fiscal deficit is added in the
policy reaction functions. It is also worth mentioning that neither the Taylor rule
nor the Taylor principle is satisfied in the reaction function specifications after the
incorporation of fiscal deficit.
Thus, it can be concluded that augmented policy reaction functions that ignore
the fiscal deficit appear to capture the behavior of the monetary authority in Sri
Lanka more accurately. Since there is less evidence available in the empirical
literature on the Taylor rule for developing countries, the findings of this study
provide incentives to propose a rule-based monetary policy for developing
economies.
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Appendix
Figure A1.
Behaviour of the Variables
The detailed descriptions of the variables are given in Table A1.
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Figure A1.
Behaviour of the Variables (Continued)
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Figure A1.
Behaviour of the Variables (Continued)
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Table A1.
Definition of the Variables and Data Sources
This table presents a definition of the variables and notes their source. CBSL-Central Bank of Sri Lanka, DCSDepartment of Census and Statistics of Sri Lanka, FAO-Food and Agricultural Organization.

Variable
CPI
RGDP
TBILL
EXR
OIL
GDPGAP
INFGAP
FB
CPIRATE

Definition of Variables

Data Source

Consumer Price Index
Real GDP
Shor-term Interest Rate (Tbill-3 months)
Exchange Rate (USA/LKR)
Brent Oil Price
Output Gap
Inflation Gap
Fiscal Balance (surplus/deficit) (% of GDP)
Inflation Rate

DCS
DCS
CBSL
CBSL
Bloomberg
Estimated
Estimated
CBSL
DCS

Table A2.
Descriptive Statistics of the Variables (Full Sample)
The detailed description of the variables is given in Table A1.

Description
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewnes
Kurtosis
JB-Stat
Obs

CPI

CPIRATE

RGDP

TBILL

EXR

FB

69.603
44.976
206.595
5.402
62.303
0.806
2.184
62.019
456

10.460
9.862
32.557
-2.300
6.472
0.716
3.444
42.813
456

5.202
5.055
15.780
-3.836
2.466
0.217
5.999
174.572
456

12.142
12.000
21.300
5.740
3.508
0.199
2.221
14.543
456

74.677
67.700
153.670
18.000
40.693
0.234
1.689
36.790
456

8.457
7.729
19.784
5.065
2.716
1.846
7.557
653.632
456

Table A3.
Simple Correlation Matrix (Full Sample)
Variable
CPI
FB
GDP
TBILL
EXR

CPI

FB

GDP

TBILL

EXR

1
-0.5780
0.0890
-0.5349
0.9518

1
0.0637
0.2359
-0.6238

1
-0.2128
0.0429

1
-0.4987

1
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